四川农业大学学报 ›› 2012, Vol. 30 ›› Issue (04): 473-477.doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1000-2650.2012.04.019

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农村环境治理的现实困境与机制创新——基于委托代理的博弈分析

王阳1, 漆雁斌2   

  1. 1. 成都信息工程学院商学院, 成都 610225;
    2. 四川农业大学经济管理学院, 四川 温江 611130
  • 收稿日期:2012-03-19 出版日期:2012-12-31 发布日期:2017-02-28
  • 作者简介:王阳,经济学博士,工商管理博士后,副教授,硕士生导师,研究方向为公司金融、农村金融,E-mail:wang_yang_2009@163.com。
  • 基金资助:
    教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(12YJC790195);中国博士后基金(2012M511923)

Study on Practical Dilemma and Mechanism Innovation of Rural Environment Governance: Using Game Analysis Based on Principal Agent

WANG Yang1, QI Yan-bin2   

  1. 1. Business School, Chengdu University of Information Technology, Chengdu 610041, China;
    2. College of Economics and Management, Sichuan Agricultural University, Wenjiang 611130, Sichuan, China
  • Received:2012-03-19 Online:2012-12-31 Published:2017-02-28

摘要: [目的] 分析比较农村环境治理中不同主体的监督效率及其对农户环境治理意愿的影响。[方法] 基于委托-代理理论构建了一个农村环保项目实施中的道德风险模型。[结果] 由于农村环境的公共品性质和监督上的困难,原子化的农户常采取搭便车行为,使农村环保陷入"囚徒困境";内生于乡土社会的农民合作组织利用成员间的重复博弈和"熟人社会"形成的监督优势,可以提高农户的环保投入能力,激励农户的环境治理意愿;通过互联合同把环境治理行为内嵌在新型农业产业化组织中,利用不同合作领域的监督,可以进一步增强农户的环境治理意愿。[结论] 未来的机制创新必须在尊重农户主体地位的基础上,充分发挥各种类型农民合作组织在环境治理上的优势。

关键词: 农村环境治理, 监督成本, 农民合作组织, 互联合同农户

Abstract: [Objective] This study compares the monitoring efficiency among different governing subjects and analyses its effect on farmers environment protection intentions. [Method] Based on principal-agent theory, it constructs the model of moral hazard in the implementation phase of rural environment protection project. [Results] The results indicate that because of the public ownership property of rural environment and difficulties in monitoring, scattered peasants often take some measures to free ride eventually leads rural environment protection into so called "prisoner dilemma". Mutual supervision which will reduce the monitoring cost among the farmer cooperative organization can be used to improve peasants' willingness-to-pay and ability-to-pay for the environment protection. We can embed environment protection behaviour into agricultural industrialization organization by means of interrelated contracts, and making use of monitoring in different cooperative spheres, in order to make further improvement. [Conclusion] The future reform model should give full play to the monitoring advantage of different type of farmer cooperative organizations.

Key words: rural environment governance, monitoring cost, farmer cooperative organization, interrelated contracts

中图分类号: 

  • F325