关键词: 农村环境治理, 监督成本, 农民合作组织, 互联合同农户

Abstract: [Objective] This study compares the monitoring efficiency among different governing subjects and analyses its effect on farmers environment protection intentions. [Method] Based on principal-agent theory, it constructs the model of moral hazard in the implementation phase of rural environment protection project. [Results] The results indicate that because of the public ownership property of rural environment and difficulties in monitoring, scattered peasants often take some measures to free ride eventually leads rural environment protection into so called "prisoner dilemma". Mutual supervision which will reduce the monitoring cost among the farmer cooperative organization can be used to improve peasants' willingness-to-pay and ability-to-pay for the environment protection. We can embed environment protection behaviour into agricultural industrialization organization by means of interrelated contracts, and making use of monitoring in different cooperative spheres, in order to make further improvement. [Conclusion] The future reform model should give full play to the monitoring advantage of different type of farmer cooperative organizations.

Key words: rural environment governance, monitoring cost, farmer cooperative organization, interrelated contracts