四川农业大学学报 ›› 2015, Vol. 33 ›› Issue (04): 458-463.doi: 10.16036/j.issn.1000-2650.2015.04.017

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集体建设用地流转中集体经济组织行为分析——基于鹰鸽博弈理论

刘靖羽, 尹奇, 陈文宽   

  1. 四川农业大学管理学院, 四川 温江 611130
  • 收稿日期:2015-08-30 出版日期:2015-12-31 发布日期:2017-02-28
  • 通讯作者: 尹奇,副教授,主要从事土地经济与管理的研究,E-mail:25575670@qq.com。 E-mail:25575670@qq.com
  • 作者简介:刘靖羽,硕士研究生。
  • 基金资助:
    四川省社会科学规划重大项目(SC14ZD09)

The Game Analysis on the Behavior of Rural Collective Economic Organization in the Collective Construction Land Transfer: Based on the Theory of Hawk-dove Game

LIU Jing-yu, YIN Qi, CHEN Wen-kuan   

  1. College of Management, Sichuan Agricultural University, Wenjiang 611130, Sichuan, China
  • Received:2015-08-30 Online:2015-12-31 Published:2017-02-28

摘要: [目的] 探究农村集体经济组织在集体建设用地流转中的策略选择,并为缓解农村集体经济组织和农户双方博弈问题,建立有序集体土地流转市场提供政策指导。[方法] 借鉴西方经济学分析方法,采用变异后"鹰鸽博弈"模型,建立农村集体经济组织与农户之间的博弈模型。[结果] 集体建设用地流转过程中,农户与农村集体经济组织双方流转中策略选择与自身信息量大小以及自身实力程度无关,只与其流转利益、冲突成本有关。[结论] 政府应完善农村集体建设用地的流转与产权制度,并加大农民决策自主性。

关键词: 农村建设用地流转, 鹰鸽博弈, 策略选择

Abstract: [Objective] To analyze the strategy choices of rural collective economic organizations in collective construction land transfer, solve the problem of game between rural collective economic organizations and farmers, and provide policy guidance for establishing orderly collective land transfer market. [Method] The variation "Hawk-dove game" was used to establish the model of game between rural collective economic organizations and farmers. [Results] In the process of collective construction land transfer, the strategy choices of farmers and rural collective economic organizations are not related to the amount of their information or their own strength, but are related to the interests of transfer and the cost of conflicts only. [Conclusion] The government should improve the system of land transfer and property rights of rural collective construction, and increase farmers' decision-making autonomy.

Key words: rural construction land transfer, Hawk-dove game, strategy choice

中图分类号: 

  • F301.2